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1 Introduction 
Caseworkers in employment offices usually have dual roles of jobseeker counselling 
and monitoring and may differ in performing these tasks. Behncke, Frölich, and Lechner 
(2010; henceforth BFL) found for Switzerland that less cooperative caseworkers increase the 
reemployment chances of unemployed. Reconsidering their linked jobseeker-caseworker data, 
this paper decomposes the average treatment effect on the treated (ATET) of having a less 
cooperative caseworker into an “indirect” effect through the assignment of an active labour 
market programme (ALMP) and a “direct” effect comprising all remaining causal 
mechanisms. That is, we consider the costly tool of ALMPs1 as an explicit mediator of 
caseworkers’ counselling style. Applying a sequential conditional independence assumption 
and propensity score matching, our findings suggest that the total effect is driven by channels 
other than programme participation, which increase employment by initially roughly 1.5 
percentage points, though the effect levels off over time. In contrast, the indirect path is never 
economically or statistically significant, such that the success of non-cooperative caseworkers 
does apparently not come from more effective ALMPs. 
The literature on direct and indirect effects or mediation analysis (see Baron and Kenny, 
1986) has recently moved towards flexible modelling, see for instance Flores and Flores-
Lagunes (2009), Imai, Keele, and Yamamoto (2010), and Huber (2014). As methodological 
contribution, we propose a propensity score matching approach for estimating direct and 
indirect effects on the treated based on two matching steps using two different propensity 
scores: the conditional probabilities of treatment (i) given covariates and (ii) given covariates 
and mediators. On the empirical side, we are the first to evaluate the causal mechanisms of 
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In 2003, training programmes cost on average 110 CHF per person and day (plus additional expenses of 11 CHF for 
travelling etc.), employment programmes 98 CHF (plus 12 CHF), see Lalive, Zehnder, and Zweimüller, J. (2006). 
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caseworkers’ placement success in a mediation framework using linked survey-administrative 
data on caseworkers and jobseekers.    
The remainder is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the econometric framework. 
Section 3 describes the data and selection issues. Section 4 presents the results.  
2 Econometric framework 
2.1 Potential outcomes and different causal effects 
We aim at disentangling the effect of a binary treatment (D) on some outcome (Y) into a 
direct effect and an indirect effect operating through a possibly multidimensional mediator 
(M). We denote by Y(d) and M(d) the potential outcome and mediator states under treatment 
{1,0}d  and by   1 (1) (0) | 1D E Y Y D     the ATET. To disentangle 1D , rewrite the 
potential outcome as a function of both the treatment and the mediator: Y(d)=Y(d,M(d)). This 
allows formulating the direct effect ( 1( )D d  ), i.e. the fraction of the total effect which is not 
attributed to the mediator, and the indirect effect ( 1( )D d  ), i.e. the fraction attributed to the 
mediator, on the treated population:2 
 
 
1
1
( ) (1, ( )) (0, ( )) | 1 ,
( ) ( , (1)) ( , (0)) | 1 , {1,0}.
D
D
d E Y M d Y M d D
d E Y d M Y d M D d




  
   
    (1) 
Concerning the direct effect, Vansteelandt and VanderWeele (2012) argue that 
focussing on (1)M  appears to be the natural reference for treated subjects when the choice of 
reference levels is a priori hard to justify, because (1)M  corresponds to the actual choice of 
the treated: 
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 Robins and Greenland (1992) and Pearl (2001) use the denomination pure/total and natural direct and indirect effects, 
respectively. 
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   1(1) (1, (1)) (0, (1)) | 1 (0, (1)) | 1D E Y M Y M D E Y Y M D        .   (2) 
As the ATET is the sum of the direct and indirect effects defined on opposite treatment states, 
   1 1 1(1, (1)) (0, (1)) | 1 (0, (1)) (0, (0)) | 1 (1) (0),D D DE Y M Y M D E Y M Y M D            
the indirect effect 1(0)D   corresponds to the difference between the ATET and 1(1)D  : 
 1 1 1(0) (1) (0, (1)) (0, (0)) | 1 .D D D E Y M Y M D             (3) 
In this paper, we therefore aim at identifying and estimating (2) and (3).3  
2.2 Identifying assumptions and estimation 
We impose sequential conditional independence of the treatment and the mediator:4 
Assumption 1: { (0, ), (0)} |Y m M D X x  for all m and x in the common support.  
Assumption 1 states that the joint distribution of the potential outcomes (for any m) and 
mediators under non-treatment are independent of the treatment conditional on X. This rules 
out unobserved confounders affecting the treatment on the one hand and the potential 
outcome and/or mediator under D=0 on the other hand, after controlling for observables.  
Assumption 2: (0, ) | ,Y m M X x D d   for all m, d, and x in the common support.  
By Assumption 2 the potential outcome under non-treatment and the observed mediator are 
independent conditional on the covariates and the treatment.5 This implies that Y(0,m) is 
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 The question asked by focussing on (2) and (3) is: “To which extent do the non-cooperative caseworkers’ current ALMP 
strategies and other mechanisms contribute to the overall effect?” This is different to: “How effective are specific 
combinations of caseworker types and programmes, given that policy makers may prescribe either?”, which may be 
addressed by multiple or dynamic treatment evaluation, see for instance Imbens (2000) and Lechner (2009). Answering 
the first question explores the causal mechanisms underlying the status quo, while answering the second may help 
improving upon the status quo. 
4
  Our identifying assumptions differ from those of Vansteelandt and VanderWeele (2012) who allow for confounding of M, 
but impose stronger assumptions on the potential outcomes.   
5
  Our assumptions require that Y(0, M(1)) and Y(0, M(0)) take the same value whenever M(1) = M(0). This would be 
violated if the actual content of a formally identical ALMP differed across D conditional on X. 
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conditionally independent of (the common-world state) M(0) whenever D=0 and of (the 
cross-world state) M(1) whenever D=1. 
Assumption 3: Pr( 1| , ) 1D M X  .  
By Assumption 3, there exists no combination of M, X that predicts treatment receipt with 
probability one.  
Theorem 1: Under Assumptions 1 to 3, the following equalities hold:  
[ (0, (1)) | 1]E Y M D    
, | 1
[ [ | , , 0]]
M X D
E E Y M X D

 ,                                    (4) 
  [ (0, (0)) | 1]E Y M D    
| 1
[ [ | , 0]]
X D
E E Y X D

 ,                                                 (5) 
with
|
[ ]
A B b
E C

denoting the expectation of C taken over the distribution of A conditional on B=b. 
Thus, 1(1)D   and 1(0)D   are identified. Proof: See Appendix A. 
Our Theorem 1 and its proof are similar to Theorem 1 of Imai, Keele, and Yamamoto 
(2010), albeit the latter focus on the total population, while we consider the treated. Instead of 
conditioning on M and X as in (4) and (5), the results of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) imply 
that identification is also obtained conditional on the propensity scores 
( , ) Pr( 1| , )mxp M X D M X   and ( ) Pr( 1| )xp X D X  , which balance the distributions of 
(M, X) and X, respectively:6 
1
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We therefore propose estimating the direct and indirect effects by propensity score-based 
matching of non-treated observations to the treated (i) using the estimated ( , )mxp M X  to 
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 Specifically, | ( ) ( )
x x
X D p X p x  and ( , ) | ( , ) ( , )
mx mx
M X D p M X p m x  for all m, x in the common support. 
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obtain an estimate of 1(1)D   and (ii) using the estimated ( )xp X  to estimate the ATET from 
which the direct effect is subtracted to estimate 1(0)D  .
7   
We use distance-weighted radius matching on the propensity score with bias adjustment 
(see Lechner,  Miquel, and Wunsch, 2011) and model ( )xp X  and ( , )mxp M X  by flexible 
probit specifications. Concerning inference, we apply block bootstrapping and (i) resample 
caseworkers along with their joobseekers to account for clustering, (ii) compute the bootstrap 
t-statistics of the effects, and (iii) estimate the p-value as the smoothed share of absolute 
bootstrap t-statistics that exceeds the absolute t-statistic in the original sample, see Racine and 
MacKinnon (2007).   
3 Empirical implementation 
3.1 Study sample and definition of treatment, mediators, and outcomes 
The study sample comprises individuals who registered at Swiss employment offices in 
2003. Our administrative data include among others nationality, qualification, education, 
experience, profession and industry of last job, participation in ALMPs, employment 
histories, and regional characteristics. They were linked to a caseworker survey on aims, 
strategies, and processes of employment offices and caseworkers. The sample definition 
follows BFL (see Appendix B.1.) and ultimately contains 1,284 caseworkers and 100,120 
unemployed. 
The survey contained a question on the importance of cooperation with the jobseeker, 
see Table 2.1.8 As in BFL, the treatment (D) is one if the caseworker chose option 2 or 3 (is 
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 Without interactions between D and M in the outcome model, the indirect effect could alternatively be identified as the 
effect of D on M multiplied with the effect of M on Y. This approach could incorporate post-treatment confounders 
influenced by D that affect both M and Y. There exists thus a trade-off between model flexibility and allowing for post-
treatment confounding, see for instance Imai and Yamamoto (2013). 
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less cooperative) and zero otherwise.9 The mediator (M) is the first participation in an ALMP 
within six months after starting the unemployment spell. We categorize ALMPs into six 
mutually exclusive groups: job search training, personality course, language skill training, 
computer training, vocational training, and participation in an employment pro-
gramme/internship. Together with non-participation, this entails seven possible mediator 
states. Estimation is based on six dummies for each ALMP being the first programme in 2003. 
Table B2.1 in Appendix B.2 provides the frequencies of ALMPs across treatment states.   
Table 2.1: Survey question on cooperativeness of the caseworker 
How important do you consider the cooperation with the jobseeker, regarding placements and assignment of active labour 
market programmes? 
 1  Cooperation is very important; the wishes of the unemployed person should be satisfied. 
 2  Cooperation is important, but placements and ALMP should sometimes be assigned or declined in spite of  
 unemployed person's wishes. 
 3  Cooperation is less important; I should assign placements and ALMP independent of the wishes of the  
 unemployed person 
Note:  52% of the caseworkers chose option one, 39% of caseworkers chose option two, and 9% of caseworkers chose 
option three. Only very few caseworkers did not respond to this particular question. They are dropped from the anal-
ysis.   
The outcome (Y) is a binary employment indicator on monthly bases. An individual is 
considered employed if she has de-registered at the employment office and the exit state is 
employment. As the mediator causally precedes the outcome, we only consider employment 
states assessed from month 8 after caseworker assignment (at least one month after 
programme start). At least 29 outcome periods are available: At the latest, jobseekers are 
assigned to a caseworker in the end of 2003 so that the mediators are measured from the 
beginning until the first half of 2004 and the outcome from the second half of 2004 until the 
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 According to the survey, non-cooperative caseworkers consider control and sanctions, job assignments, and employment 
programmes as more important, and counselling meetings and temporary wage subsidies as less important. They also 
stated to assign ALMPs to exert pressure and to control their clients' availability for jobs. 
9
 The self-reported treatment may contain measurement error with respect to the actual cooperativeness. For instance, some 
caseworkers might state to be (non-)cooperative but act differently in practice and this may be correlated with unobserved 
characteristics like personal integrity that also affect the outcomes. We nevertheless believe that measurement error is 
limited, as there are no obvious incentives for misreporting (like justification bias). 
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end of in 2006. We therefore estimate the effects over a period of 1.5 to 3 years after case-
worker assignment. 
3.2 Selectivity of the treatment and the mediators 
Our strategy requires observing all confounders of the relationship of the outcome with 
both the treatment and/or the mediator (conditional on treatment). BFL argue that treatment 
selection depends on the types of hired caseworkers, the assignment of unemployed to 
caseworkers, and the development of the caseworkers’ attitudes as they gain work experience. 
As attitudes may be related to job placement success, we control for caseworker 
characteristics like age, gender, education, work experience, and own unemployment 
experience. We also control for rules assigning the unemployed to caseworkers, as stated in 
the survey. Furthermore, caseworkers may react differently to various types of unemployed 
and the labour market environment. Therefore, we include a range of jobseeker characteristics 
like gender, qualification, previous occupation, labour market history, and a caseworker-
provided employability rating, as well as local labour market conditions.  
Nevertheless, some individual characteristics like skills not reflected in qualifications, 
attitude, and motivation are unobserved, but arguably associated with observables. For 
instance, motivation should correlate with the labour market history and the employability 
rating (which should furthermore also capture unobserved skills). We therefore believe that 
conditional on observables, variation in the assignment of caseworker types is likely 
exogenous and for instance related to the current availability and work load of caseworkers.  
Characteristics that have been identified as controls for caseworker cooperativeness are 
also expected to influence selection into the programmes. As argued by Gerfin and Lechner 
(2002)  and many others, the assignment of ALMPs is likely driven by the jobseeker’s socio-
economic background, previous occupation and labour market experience, employability, and 
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regional characteristics. In addition, caseworker characteristics might affect the assignment 
strategy. Conditional on these factors, exogenous variation in ALMPs likely comes from 
differences in their availability across employment offices. Finally, it is worth noting that pro-
gramme assignment usually takes place early in the unemployment spell, so that time-varying 
confounding of the mediators due to changes in relevant factors during the unemployment 
spell is likely a minor issue. The fact that we use a (short) six months window for programme 
start is also in favour of this argument.  
Table B.2.2 in Appendix B.2 provides descriptive statistics for a range of confounders 
by treatment and programme status. While there is limited selection with respect to 
caseworker rigour, perhaps with the exception of regional aspects, selection into the 
programmes is much stronger and driven by several factors. See also Table B.3 of Appendix 
B.3 for the propensity score specifications. Appendix C contains tests for whether the propen-
sity scores balance the characteristics of treated and non-treated in matching estimation (Ta-
bles C.1 and C.2) and suggest that balancing works well. 
4 Results 
Figure 6.1 contains the ATET as well as the direct and indirect effects among the treated 
on employment from month 8 to 36. The three lines represent the total, direct, and indirect 
effects and superimposed symbols imply that these particular effects are (pointwise) 
significant at the indicated level.10 The results suggest that initially, less cooperative 
caseworkers significantly increase employment by roughly 1.5%-points. Over time, however, 
the ATET vanishes and is not statistically significant after month 14, even though it remains 
positive in almost all months. The (initial) employment gain is mainly driven by the direct 
effect of caseworker rigour, the indirect mechanism through ALMPs is never significant.  
                                                                
10
 Appendix D provides the results for the outcomes unemployment with benefit receipt and looking for a job. 
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Our estimates therefore suggest that the (at least initially) higher job placement rates of 
less cooperative caseworkers are not due to better programmes, but rather to other dimensions 
that possibly include the threat of sanctions11 or pressure to go to job interviews.  This 
suggests that policy makers should not only be interested in the effective provision of 
ALMPs, but also in the analysis of other dimensions of caseworkers’ counselling style, which 
can apparently make a difference. 
Figure 6.1: Effects on employment by month after registration 
 
Note:  A route / triangle / circle implies pointwise significance at the 10% / 5% / 1% level, respectively.  
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